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Introduction 
How we know: if there were one answer to this question, historians and social scientists, even 
most philosophers, would not be asking it.  When we study knowledge, we usually see different 
knowing practices: scholarly, artisanal, philosophical, experimental, mathematical.  This 
expectation holds across the arts and sciences and beyond, even in the early modern period.  The 
knowing practices of artisans, physicians and medical practitioners of all sorts, jurists, farmers, 
theologians, merchants, engineers, actuaries, householding women, administrators or indeed “the 
state” are all now under study for their relevance – and hence necessarily their distinctive 
relevance – to the history of science broadly conceived.1  The fading of the idea of “the” 
scientific method, itself relatively recent, spurred the search for styles or “ways of knowing” or 
far-reaching practices of quantifying, visualizing, being objective, establishing facts, managing 
information and renewed the study of transfer across domains and learned/lay divides without 
assuming diffusion from above or from European centers.2  All this research presupposes 
plurality.  Distinction is especially evident in public settings, where special knowledge typically 
is claimed by groups or individuals and put to use by states, courts of law, and communities, and 
where historians study the construction and contestation of expertise as well as the interaction of 
different “experts” – scientific, medical, legal, or more specialized – with each other and with 
“lay” people.3   
Yet the early modern period, we propose, offers an opposite story about the same 
plurality of knowers and domains, a story that also promises insight into modern times.  It is a 
history of common rather than uncommon knowing, of shared empirical rational practices rather 
than specialties and interactions, a history that the very focus on “expertise” tends to obscure.  
We tell one version of this history through a collection of stories.  They were cases in their time, 
and in this paper they stand for other similar ones. They take place where we would expect them 
least: in those places of distinction among knowers, public settings. 
Hans Mohr, Highest Justice of the Free Imperial City of Frankfurt am Main, wanted to 
know “whether the cranium and the dura and pia mater had been damaged by the beating.”  
This seems a question for the surgeon.  But it was asked of Katharina Hansenn, 
housewife.  And she answered.4  
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It was Thursday, the twenty-first of May 1551.  Mohr’s task was to provide evidence 
(beweisen) as to whether Anna, wife of Martin Rode, had died from maltreatment by her 
husband or from unrelated illness.5  So in the Rathaus that day and the following week, he 
questioned 21 “witnesses.”  They ranged from university-educated doctors to barber-surgeons to 
neighbors and relatives.  There is nothing remarkable in this.  Until we notice that Justice Mohr 
was asking doctors and housewives the same questions.6  All were expected to answer questions 
we would call “medical” or “for experts,” and by and large they did.  Moreover, as we shall see, 
these questions concerned both what was seen (as one would ask of an eyewitness) and how and 
why death occurred (as one would ask of an expert witness).  This is the observation from which 
the argument of this paper unfolds.  The central claim is that groups of widely differing status, 
education, occupation, and experience in fact shared empirical rational practices.  These were 
practices of observation, description, explanation, and argument.   
This argument unfolds across a range of at least five different kinds of case of inquiry for 
public decision: from the diseased former soldier accused of endangering his community (purity 
and danger, public health) to the artisan family seeking annulment of a marriage (family 
economy, material production and human reproduction) to surgeons under investigation for 
malpractice (guild regulation of a trade and practical art) to individuals claiming community 
resources (charitable care, poor relief) to classical forensic cases like that in which Hausfrau 
Hansenn testified over the body of Anna (conflict and violence).  These situations of uncertainty 
or disagreement occurred in a variety of polities in the Holy Roman Empire between the 1510s 
and the 1650s.  Resolving them in ways acceptable to their communities involved making 
observations and arguments about the body in health and illness, anatomy, diet, materia medica, 
relations between bodies and their natural and human environments, law, and the practical arts. 
The cases come from three kinds of source, each representing an agency of inquiry and 
evaluation: the archives of a government (Frankfurt am Main, a city-state), a medical faculty 
(Tübingen, university of a territorial state, the Duchy of Württemberg), and a guild (or more 
precisely the sworn jurymen master barber-surgeons nominated from their guild in a major 
center of wealth and the arts, Ulm).7  Studies of public cases involving human bodies usually 
concern one or two of the classic forensic types (infanticide, insanity) and one or two kinds of 
participant, such as physicians.  Or they focus on the female body.8  The present study makes a 
simple move: to study the full range of participants and a variety of situations at once, involving 
both male and female bodies.  This method is, moreover, to read without assuming who knows 
and to look for commonality of practice as much as construction of difference.  Each case 
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examined here, we find, displays the same broad participation and commonality across 
difference that is evident in the story of the inquiry into Anna’s death in Frankfurt in 1551. 
This commonality is unexpected: generally for the reasons already given and specifically 
because we know to expect conflict and strategies of distinction among health practitioners in all 
their early modern variety – doctors, midwives, barber-surgeons, herb women, apothecaries, 
“empirics” and purveyors of “secret remedies,” clerics, bonesetters, astrologers, and so on – and 
from others claiming knowledge in public settings.9  Moreover, the shared language (humoral, 
Galenic) by which the body – especially the female body – was understood by doctors and 
patients and in both learned and vernacular medical literature is well known,10 but is not the 
same as shared practices of inspecting, describing, and constructing or countering evidence and 
explanation.  In the ever wider and more various social history of knowledge, as Peter Burke 
writes in his survey under that name, medicine exemplifies the “plurality of knowledges.”11  This 
is a reason to consider broadly the implications of the cases presented in this paper. 
There are further reasons we can expect to learn generally about knowledge, society, and 
expertise by studying cases involving the human body.  The first is range.  Trials, inquiries, 
inspections: cases we consider range from criminal justice to civil contracts, from public health 
to municipal aid to guild regulation of trades, and generally across “Policey,” the broad early 
modern term for the tens of thousands of ordinances and countless individual proceedings that 
comprised social, economic, and environmental regulation.12  Thus our findings are not 
particular to this or that kind of legal or administrative process.13  There were formal differences 
between domains such as law (Recht), police, guild, and market and between proceedings such 
as inspection (Schau) and trial in court (Gericht).  Yet focusing on bodies and their environments 
brings together cases from all these domains and brings their similarities into view.14  This 
omnipresence of the body entails a second reason we stand to learn from cases involving it.  
Healers testified throughout the medieval and early modern periods, while representatives of 
other occupations that could claim special knowledge and experience and that came to be called 
expert rarely did so until the 18th and 19th centuries.15 Healers had, on the other hand, no 
monopoly: knowledge of the body and of natural environments and substances in relation to 
health was widespread, in both oral and written form and in the form of domestic practice.16  
This conjunction of contraries – being the knowers most called upon by the polity and, at the 
same time, sharing knowledge with many others – will test, in case studies, expertise as the 
currently standard way of thinking about practical knowledge in action.  
Why, then, early modern Germany?  Recent research on politics in the Holy Roman 
Empire between the 16th and the 18th centuries has revealed a staggering degree of participation 
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and initiative “from below” in the political life of communities, especially cities, and thus 
essentially in their government.17  This has been shown for free imperial cities yet also where 
less expected: in territorial “police” states and in so-called inquisitorial criminal justice systems, 
which had long been the very image of expert-based government and social control – and in 
Anglo-American historiography of science and medicine still are.18  Broad political participation 
on one hand and, on the other, prevalence of university-trained knowers in government in the 
part of Europe that gave us cameralism and “sciences of state” (Staatswissenschaften): this 
conjunction of apparent contraries makes early modern German public cases good for thinking 
about these matters at large.  Moreover, the new history of political participation and interaction 
does not look at participants as knowers.  And it virtually ignores the practices of artisanal 
groups and learned ones, which are the subject of separate old literatures on guilds and 
universities and on law, medicine, theology, and humanism, and of separate newer literatures on 
artisanal knowledge and how-to, learned practices, political counsel, jurists practicing rather than 
prescribing, academic ritual, and “scholars in action” – altogether difficult to grasp except as 
different kinds and cultures of expertise.19  Public cases allow us to look instead at everyone in 
the same settings, reporting on and judging the same situations.  
So inclusive is this story of knowing that it includes one other character not usually in the 
cast: the accused.20 Studied by historians mainly as the human objects of inquiry,21 they were 
equally its subjects – sometimes more than equally, when they won their cases. This is the focus 
of the first section of the paper.  The second section broadens to show that all kinds of 
participants dealt with the same questions using the same or comparable sorts of empirical 
rational practice.  This did not make participants interchangeable.  Groups differed in education, 
occupation, and experience and in function in public proceedings.  At times they competed for 
authority.  Instead of starting from groups and examining their interaction,22 however, we start 
from what all kinds of participant did throughout a trial, inspection, or inquiry and ask, in section 
three, what happened to difference and commonality along the way.  
 
1.  Subjects of Knowledge 
Creating information, controlling knowledge: these capacities, our case studies suggest, 
were not restricted to city councillors, jurymen, judges, their advisors, and medical “experts.”  
They were also in the hands of the accused, which were less bound than usually imagined, and in 
the hands of wider informed publics.  Contrary to principles of inquisition and contrary to the 
long tradition of regarding criminal law as an arm of the state for social control, we know from 
historical research since the 1990s that most policing action and most judicial proceedings in 
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early modern Europe were initiated by individuals rather than by the authorities.23  Moreover, the 
majority of trials for capital crimes, even in the age of the so-called Carolina (from Constitutio 
Criminalis Carolina) and its precursor codifications of inquisitorial criminal justice in the Holy 
Roman Empire, roughly 1500-1800, ended with much milder punishments or with various forms 
of peaceful conflict-resolution between the parties of victim and accused. All such outcomes 
were determined by very broad written and oral participation by relatives, friends, communities, 
and the accused him or herself.  Unexamined in this new history of criminal justice as 
“consensual practice” and “clearing place” for conflicts are questions of evidence and argument, 
knowledge and expertise.24  What we show in this section is, first, the knowledge component of 
such activity and, second, that patterns of informed action reached far beyond proceedings of 
criminal law to other situations that turned on evaluating the conditions of and events around a 
human body and in which observations were made, evidence produced and debated, and 
judgments delivered.   
The trial of Martin Rode, with its medical arguments and many medical witnesses, seems 
to exemplify the rising role of medical expertise in the 16th century.25  Yet the trial and its 
associated inquiries were in many ways created through the knowledgeable action of the accused 
and of a wide public.  This was not because of Rode’s social status: he is addressed in documents 
as barrel-maker, indicating a modest income; according to witnesses, he was also innkeeper and 
owner of a vineyard, indicating a higher income.26  Rumors that Rode had hit his wife Anna such 
that she died travelled at least as far as Heidelberg, almost a hundred kilometres away.27 The 
governors of Frankfurt could not ignore such rumors without appearing to neglect central tasks 
of an imperial city’s council: to protect the rights of burghers, to ensure justice and to re-
establish “order” when it was disturbed.  The sheer number of Rode-related entries minuted in 
the council proceedings of 1551 indicates that the challenge was taken up.28  The part played by 
doctors and barber-surgeons increased rather than resolved uncertainty: results of examination 
and partial autopsy of Anna’s corpse tended to absolve Rode. Partly on that basis, the accused 
and his legal counsel asserted a right to call witnesses.  Highest Justice Mohr tried to prevent this 
and to keep to a purely inquisitorial form of trial in which he alone would decide who testified.  
But the accused prevailed over the inquisitor.29  In fact, the questions put to witnesses in the file 
titled “Hans Mohr Highest Worldly Justice against Martin Rode Barrelmaker” were mainly 
generated not by Mohr in his fact-finding function, as inquisitor, but by the defense mounted by 
the barrelmaker and his lawyer.30  Thus although the case turned on questions we would call 
medical, it was being shaped far less by medical expertise than as a kind of informed debate that 
began with public opinion (“rumor”), continued in meetings of an elected governing council, and 
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reached fullest form in hearings that, through the knowledgeable action of the accused and his 
lawyer, created and tested alternative accounts of an event in the physical and human world.   
None of this was new in 1550.  Before exploring the Rode hearings, let us consider an 
earlier, simpler yet analogous case.  In 1517 in Frankfurt, Clauß Guntram was charged with 
killing a man named Genßhenn.  The defendant claimed that he had wounded Genßhenn 
unwillingly in an act of self-defence and that his alleged victim did not die from this injury but 
had in fact been cured before he died and that an intervening illness had led to his death. 
Guntram named a number of witnesses, who testified that the stab injury had been completely 
healed after less than three weeks and that Genßhenn had thereafter been back to work, hauling 
wood, and walking distances, and even celebrating his recovery.31  Among these witnesses was a 
barber-surgeon. Yet the structure of such medical arguments and emphasis on evidence of 
recovery from injury reflected the state of the art in contemporary vernacular “lay” legal texts, 
such as the widely circulated Layen-Spiegel or “Layman’s Guide” to civil and criminal 
procedure, first published at Augsburg in 1509 and in thirteen more editions in the 16th century 
and would later appear in the Carolina itself, which was after all not only a new codification, but 
a lay guide, in German not Latin, to criminal procedure.32  Such texts guided lay inquisitors, but 
also the accused objects of inquiry. 
Trials for criminal offenses were not the only kind of proceeding in which the objects of 
empirical inquiry became its subjects.  Beyond autopsy and examination of wounds and corpses 
lay a wide domain of official inspection (usually Schau, sometimes Besichtigung) of the 
condition of human bodies, ranging from suspected leprosy to cases for poor relief and, as we 
show below, to cases involving marriage and family economy.  Central to the development of 
such procedures was leprosy inspection, which for centuries was very widely practised and took 
place in monasteries, in leprosaria outside of cities, in senate rooms of medical faculties or the 
dean’s own home, and in spaces specially designated by city governments.33  
Late medieval clergy, nobility, and eventually less privileged members of society 
countered accusations of leprosy by demanding that they be examined by medical doctors.34  Or 
they challenged the results of such examinations and appealed their cases.35  Official town 
physicians complained of people hiding leprosy, but also of poor people simulating the disease 
by maltreating their skin.36  For a leprosy certificate could be a ticket indoors, as could one for a 
new condition manifested on the surfaces of people’s bodies, the so-called French pox.  As 
opportunities for subsidised medical treatment increased in the 16th century, ailing inhabitants of 
towns manoeuvred for access to charitable or municipal institutions.  This entailed passing a 
medical examination – with a positive result.37  In 1544, for example, Caspar Vögelin of the 
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south German imperial city of Nördlingen reported himself to official town doctor Johann 
Widman.  The certificate issued by Dr. Widman supported Vögelin’s account of his condition 
and his suggestion that he be funded for treatment at a mineral spa: this had a chance of curing 
quickly and thus more cheaply than other methods.38  Agreement was at once medical and 
economic.  Inspection was not “expertise” imposed on the “public” or laypeople as objects of 
inquiry and knowledge. Empirical and evaluative practice that made up such “expertise” was 
Vögelin’s as well as Dr. Widman’s.  
Not all such cases went so smoothly. More conflicted ones show still more the variety of 
components that could make up knowledgeable behavior. In 1594, again in Nördlingen, Maria 
Adam showed her skin problems to the town barber-surgeon “in office” (im Amt). She did not 
get the result she expected: a certificate entitling her to months of living and being cared for in 
the pox-house at communal expense. So she took her case to the junior physician in office, to 
whom she named signs that she held were those of sickness and which according to the barber-
surgeon she had not mentioned before. And when she found that this physician agreed with the 
barber-surgeon against her interpretations and expectations, she appealed to the senior physician 
in office.39 Of course we can see this as pursuing one’s interests; more interestingly we can see it 
as a knowledge struggle, over rival diagnoses. Confident knowing of one’s history and condition, 
capacity to present and represent oneself with assurance to experts, culturally scripted behaviors 
of women’s obstinacy, civil defiance, and attempted fraud: each of these possible ways of 
interpreting events would be one or another contextual or analytical construction of Maria 
Adam’s informed behaviour.  
The most interesting such cases are those in which the person in question seems, on the 
face of it, to be thoroughly at the mercy of power and knowledge. In 1656 seventy-two-year-old 
former soldier Martin Naff appeared at the Medical Faculty of Tubingen to be examined by 
members of the faculty and a surgeon.40  He had been sent by his regional bailiff, whose office 
was in the town of Horb on the Neckar (about 30 kilometers from Tubingen) and who was the 
local representative of the policing powers of the Habsburg Empire.41  Naff’s medical history as 
related in a letter from the bailiff to the faculty revealed years of skin disease – and years of 
accusations, banishments, and in the end even incarceration. Neighbors had once “accused” Naff 
of being afflicted with Malazej (leprosy). This accusation was upheld and resulted in his 
separation from family, income, and community. In 1653 he returned with a testimony from the 
Collegium Medicum in far-away Strasbourg stating that he was free of leprosy. The following 
year, around Christmas 1654, he used an ointment, and a rash broke out on his head four weeks 
later. Instead of treating him, the barber-surgeon whom he consulted denounced Naff to the 
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authorities as having the so-called French disease. Naff spent the next four weeks in prison. The 
bailiff’s letter to the Tubingen faculty listed the allegedly “infected” parts of Naff’s body and 
demanded certainty (gewissheit) concerning the nature of the disease. Told in this way, the tale 
of Martin Naff is one of a man pushed around and battered by knowledgeable governing forces 
around him. 
Looked at more closely, however, we find the opposite. Naff’s behavior exemplifies what 
historians of the patient have revealed to be common patterns of self-directed selection of 
remedies and choosing of practitioners.42 Naff himself procured and used the guethleuth salben, 
an ointment either specifically used by lepers or produced by the inmates of a leprosarium, even 
as he denied being leprous.43 Naff himself procured from a barber-surgeon a bandage to avoid 
contamination. All in all he consulted four barber-surgeons, among these a travelling Swiss and a 
“foreigner”. Moreover, he evaluated medical treatments by refusing to pay selected bills.  Not 
paying was not simply pecuniary or deviant behavior, but a version of the negotiated patient-
practitioner relationship that was governed in other places, as Gianna Pomata has shown for 
Bologna, by written contracts for cure and tribunals for disagreements.44  And, finally, it was 
Martin Naff himself who took the initiative of seeking inspection and certification by another 
authority, the Strasbourg Collegium, and who undertook the long journey for this.  
And there is more, lest this seem mainly a history of power without much knowledge and 
information in it. Let us rejoin Naff under inspection by the Tubingen medical faculty. Contrary 
to accusations of infection, Naff argued that the condition of his health and skin derived from 
hardship during his earlier life as a soldier, from the bad dietary habits he acquired through lack 
of female company, and from the noxious vapors emanating from the walls of the various 
prisons to which he had been confined, which had damaged his rohr (bone or penis).  The 
faculty decided the same. It responded to the bailiff that Naff’s “scabies and varices” were not 
contagious but resulted from his old age and from alterations in his blood due to dietetic 
mistakes, frost, and the appalling conditions under which he had been living, and that the 
resulting signs had been misinterpreted as those of leprosy or the French disease.45  Inspection 
from above and patient narrative from below were one.  The professors were not merely 
informed by the man who was the object of inquiry: the faculty’s evaluation (Gutachten) 
was virtually Naff’s own account. Moreover, the faculty’s report was written under and signed 
by its dean, Samuel Hafenreffer, author of the first major book on skin diseases in Germany, 
which went through seven editions in the mid 17th century.46  The professor and leading 
authority shared interpretive and explanatory practice with the old soldier. 
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2.  Public of Experts   
Ways of evaluating the condition of human bodies between health, disease, and danger 
were shared not only by inspectors and inspected, but also by wider publics. Fellow inhabitants 
of Naff’s hamlet, Eutingen, participated in knowing and decision-making in situations of 
uncertainty.  
For some time clamor rings out and rumor is spread that he [Naff] is tainted with the 
epidemic French Disease. This induces abhorrence in many inhabitants of the hamlet, and 
everyone is saying that during the last summer he had rashes on his whole body. He also 
applied the leper-ointment, and with this he drove the rashes back into his body. Recently 
he also was examined by a noble barber-surgeon, who explicitly acquainted me with the 
fact that the above-mentioned Martin, a subject [under the powers] of my office, was 
infected with the mentioned pestilence inside his body, particularly in his mouth and 
other body parts.47 
 
So the bailiff wrote to the medical faculty.  Villagers’ claims were taken seriously enough to set 
in motion, repeatedly, a whole apparatus of observation, evaluation, communication, and 
intervention spread across several centers of knowledge and governance as far as a hundred 
kilometers apart.  The villagers of Eutingen were not to be overruled by the Collegium Medicum 
of Strasbourg, their opinion was supported by that of a “noble” barber-surgeon in the regional 
administrative center, and the Habsburg representative did not hesitate to refer the case to a 
medical faculty and Europe’s leading dermatological authority.  Identifying (plausibly) leprosy 
or the French Pox may seem not much to expect of villagers, until we recall that the whole 
system of official inspection, of Schau, which operated for several centuries throughout the Holy 
Roman Empire and beyond, was built up around the difficulty of making exactly these 
empirically based judgments.48  In this system, local communities in effect practiced Schau 
before the experts did.49  Like a practitioner watching his patient, the people of Naff’s hamlet 
even monitored therapeutic outcomes – the effect of an ointment – and explained them.  Their 
explanation was not “popular.”50  In explaining the perceived treatment outcome as an act of 
driving noxious matter back into the body, these villagers represented the disease in the same 
way that physicians and surgeons did.51   
Questions of community boundaries and security, of purity and danger, were not the only 
kind to be addressed through common ways of observing and judging bodies and their 
environments and evaluating their histories.  Questions of the ability to reproduce and to produce 
– of marriage, work, and family economy – were another.  These have been studied mainly as 
part of history of the body and power.52  Yet they can also be understood as belonging to the 
history of empiricism broadly conceived.   
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In 1605 in the city of Ulm, a recently betrothed dyer named Andreas Heffelin had to 
appear before a jury of seven. It was a jury of barbers: the officially sworn master barbers and 
barber-surgeons of Ulm.  This jury not only questioned and listened; it inspected. The object of 
inspection was Heffelin himself – his whole body and especially his left arm. Heffelin was being 
examined to settle the question of whether the marriage contract could be annulled.  His bodily 
condition would be decisive for this question.  Yet it had already been evaluated – by “lay” 
people, namely, his bride and father-in-law, though too late to have avoided contracting marriage 
in the first place. They presented evidence to the Ulm marriage tribunal that Heffelin might not 
be able to work at his trade and thus support his wife and family to be, and indeed that he might 
not be fit to make a family at all, in short, to produce and reproduce. On close inspection in the 
familial milieu, he appeared to have a problem with his left arm, and its condition suggested to 
the family that he could be afflicted with the French Pox, a diagnostic judgment which, as we 
have seen, was by no means obvious, even to physicians and surgeons.53  
The family’s judgment that Heffelin might have the French Pox was cogent and well 
founded enough that it took the jury of seven artisanal masters considerable empirical work – 
observational and history-taking – and knowledge of similar cases to construct an alternative 
explanation: that the damage in his left arm resulted from maltreatment of a malignant ulcer 
(Geschwer) that had affected the bone. Likewise, the family’s prognosis for Heffelin’s working 
life could only be countered persuasively by a carefully worked out and circumspect alternative 
one: that more bone fragments might break from that damage but that in the end a permanent 
cure was likely.54  
Thus Schau, the general empirical evaluative practice on which such a case turned, was 
an activity of perpetuating a community’s welfare as much in terms of its familial and economic 
reproduction (Heffelin and dyer families) as in terms of its boundaries and security (Naff and his 
hamlet).55  What was being observed and evaluated was at once a medically defined physical 
condition (ulcer, maltreatment, pox, cure) and a socially defined physical condition (productive 
and reproductive capacity in a given type of community and economy, ability to exercise a 
particular trade).  A turn of phrase clinches this identity of the medical and surgical and the 
familial and economic: the appeal to the marriage tribunal was articulated as a request to allow 
return of unsatisfactory goods: ist die Braut, wie auch iren Vattern, ein Reukauff ankomen.56 The 
term Reukauff – literally regretted purchase – denoted the right to withdraw from a sales 
contract.  A jury consisting of guild masters was hardly out of place in carrying out a procedure 
representable as quality control of goods, a typical function of guilds in their capacity of 
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evaluation,57 which was the role in which we find these barber-surgeons acting here as observer-
judges rather than healers. 
Judgment or testimony by medically trained men is thus not necessarily best understood 
as “medical expertise.”58  The same can be seen in cases of criminal law, such as the trial of 
Martin Rode.  Official town physician (Stadtarzt) Dr. Stock testified that he saw Anna when she 
had “lost her senses” before she died, but that she did not die from beating. The injury to her 
head was no Causa necessaria.  Her own bile and rage (Bilis vnd der Zoren) caused her illness.  
Had Anna died from the injury, he added, she would have shown “epilepsia”. 59 It looks as 
though Dr. Stock is applying the knowledge of the learned physician.  Yet before Dr. Stock 
testified, the court had already heard the same reasoning – from the defense lawyer: notably, the 
either/or structure of “died because of the illness and not because of the beating” and the 
argument that Anna’s symptoms when she “lost her senses” were not those of injury to the head.  
These ways of accounting for death in cases featuring variables like lapse of time between injury 
and death made up a legal literature going back to the 13th century, including case reports in the 
form of jurists’ consilia.60 
The formulae of reasoning and argument used in such cases were not empty.  They were 
a form of what is all too crudely called knowledge and can more precisely be called 
generalisations from analogous situations, yet in the form of rational practices rather than 
theories, and created through the cumulative effect of many cases rather than acts of innovation. 
Thus the formulae were not dead either. They lived through configurations of society and polity 
and the observed physical world.  “Causa non necessaria” was neither medical nor legal 
knowledge.  It expressed a configuration of exigency (the court needed a yes or no) and 
responsibility (Stock was the official town doctor, charged with forensic duties) and uncertainty 
(over a week passed between injury and death and observational evidence was varied).  The 
learned physician, in short, was equally a non-medical participant. 
And, vice versa, the housewives were as much medical as lay participants. 
“Whether the cranium and the dura and pia mater had been damaged by the beating”?  
This, as we saw at the outset of this paper, was one of the dozens of questions put by the judge to 
barber-surgeons, physicians, and – probably minus the Latin – to housewives. When Katharina 
Hansenn, housewife, answered to the effect that she observed no head injury “and indeed [the] 
only [marks] Anna had [were] small blue spots at both knees,” she was not reporting what she 
happened to glimpse in the crowded aftermath of some violent incident.61  She answered as an 
observer on a par with the medical men and as a witness to the official postmortem.  For late 
medieval Spain, Debra Blumenthal plausibly explains the continuing role and authority of 
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women without office testifying in juridical trials on a par with medical men in office because 
householding women were de facto “experts” through their domestic medical experience.62  Our 
case studies support this explanation, but it goes only so far.  Housewife attendance at Anna’s 
postmortem shows a continuum of domestic and public life.63  
As to explaining death and thus resolving the matter that busied Frankfurt almost weekly 
for much of 1551, the most cogent and evidence-based account did not come from the physicians 
or surgeons, but from the housewives and, reportedly, from the deceased herself.  
“Whether the witness,” Highest Justice Mohr asked Hausfrau Hansenn as he had asked 
Stadtarzt Stock, “holds that the fatal illness phrenesie first began on the 7th day after the beating 
and [that the deceased] had suffered long before from an internal illness such that she died 
because of the illness and not because of the beating”?64  Hansenn answered essentially yes.  She 
believed Anna “would not have died from the beating had illness not already been present 
beforehand.”  And what was this pre-existing condition?  Ever since she had had a stillbirth, she 
had not ceased to “have bodily complaints.”  Unlike the testimony by the barber-surgeons and 
physicians, this explanation accounted for major signs observed at the official autopsy.  Hansen 
ascribed the large black area on Anna’s back (which she saw only after the death) to the great 
heat of the illness.65  On the testimony of the surgeons and the physicians, these appearances 
remained apparently significant yet of uncertain meaning. 
Evidence of this internal condition was attributed to Anna herself.  Anna’s relative the 
apothecary’s wife, last of the 21 witnesses, spoke for her (in answering the fourth question to the 
40th Article, to be precise): “Yes, he did beat me, but such beating harms me not at all, if only 
the lump were not in my body, which I worry will carry me off and kill me.  Then, my Martin 
and I are content in our relationship and one.”66  We will never know for sure whether Anna 
really felt and said what others said she did, but we do know that Martin was acquitted and that – 
together with the testimony of her speakers – Anna’s was the most evidence-encompassing 
account of her own death.  Judge and jurymen could acquit with more confidence on the medical 
account given by Housewife Hansenn and Apothecary’s Housewife Wörner Winneck than that 
given by Stadtarzt Dr. Stock, not to mention the barber-surgeons who all said they couldn’t say.  
It is a fitting conclusion at this point in the story of shared empirical rational practices that the 
most robust causal explanation constructed in the trial – most robust because it accounted for 
more observations and testimony, medical or otherwise, than any other – was told as patient 
narrative. 
 
3.  Difference and Commonality  
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It may seem at this point that we have romanticised a past of knowledge shared by all and 
evaluations accepted by everyone. Yet, as emphasized from the outset, in this history of common 
knowing, there were differences among groups participating in inspections, inquiries, trials.  In 
pursuing these differences, however, we will not follow the literature on the rise of medical 
forensic expertise.67 Nor will we focus on clash or cooperation between different medical experts 
and between “expert” and “lay” witnesses, nor on their relative authority and how this changed 
historically.68  Instead, in any given case, we show momenta of differentiation and 
dedifferentiation, a term preferable to leveling, which denotes mainly the status of claims to 
knowledge or expertise.69  
On September 10, 1624, the provost of the Imperial Abbey of Wettenhausen wrote to the 
Lutheran mayor and councillors of Ulm requesting an evaluation (guttachten) by the sworn 
surgeons or the physicians in office regarding the death of one of his subjects, Margarete N.  The 
jurymen master barber-surgeons received two letters and the “instruction to find what is right.”70 
After considering the written accounts of Margarete N.’s fate, they decided it would be necessary 
to interrogate the late woman’s husband and the practitioners involved.  
It had all begun when Margarete visited a barber who agreed to let her blood, a situation 
of typical patient-practitioner commonality. All later accounts agree that she began to feel pain 
after this practitioner, “the resident village-barber” Hans Spitz, stopped the bleeding by applying 
a pressure dressing.71 That same Saturday afternoon, according to her husband’s testimony, 
Margarete demanded help from Spitz, but he made her wait till Sunday evening. In the account 
sent to the Ulm masters of surgery, Barber Spitz knew no remedy (remedium) for this pain and 
sought a nearby colleague’s evaluation and recommendation (gutachtung). This second barber 
suggested warm wine dressings. Spitz had them applied to Margarete’s arm several times that 
evening. When the pain only grew worse, Margarete consulted a third barber and for three days 
used a remedy he recommended – in vain.  Thereafter, her husband consulted Spitz again, which 
was no help. On day eight – earlier, in Spitz’s version – Margarete removed the bandage and 
walked about three kilometres to see a fourth barber. The following day, she traveled some 
eleven kilometres, still unbandaged, to see a fifth barber, named Jelin.  He “inspected” her 
wound and declared that gangrene (der kalte Brand) had taken hold in her hand. In the presence 
of “two judges” (in bey sein zweier Richter), this diagnosis was confirmed on day twelve when 
fingernails and skin could be removed without causing pain. Jelin predicted she would die and 
offered amputation as final resort. On day eighteen, Jelin in cooperation with his father, Surgery 
Master Matheis Jelin, who traveled more than twenty kilometres to operate, amputated 
Margarete’s lower arm.  This, too, was in vain.  She died thirteen days later.  Right through the 
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final stage, when Jelin diagnosed fatal gangrene and offered to amputate, Margarete typifies the 
self-directed if desperate patient, seeking help as and where she saw fit, from qualified barber-
surgeons whose capacity to know what was wrong and what to do was not fundamentally 
different from hers, yet who at the same time inspected and evaluated. In short: this is a story of 
momenta of both commonality of knowing and differentiation of knowing into procedures. 
These contrary momenta continued during the inquiry.  The provost wanted to know 
which of the barbers who accused each other was to blame for the death of Margarete, which 
barber would have to answer to the husband’s monetary damage claims, and which practitioner 
would have to be paid by whom. The master jurymen of surgery had to judge not only whether 
Spitz, the first barber, or one of his colleagues, was the “causer of such an irreversible event,” 
but also whether one of them should be banned from the surgical art.72 In their report, they 
approved the various barbers’ remedies as conforming to the art and remarked that Jelin, the 
amputator, had not been accused. They concluded by explaining the course of the illness and 
effectively blaming the patient: removing the bandages prevented recovery. This was, in effect, 
to close ranks in a situation that threatened to undermine the legitimacy of an entire region’s 
official surgical practice. Humoral theory supported this account: removing the bandages had 
allowed moisture into the limb; thus deprived of its natural warmth, the limb died of gangrene. 
Not theory, but documented experience supported the patient’s account: she removed bandages 
and, in the most active possible way, sought further help because she knew by experience that 
the dressings were not lessening the pain and that she needed other remedies.  The jury of 
masters knew by theory that removing the bandages led to fatal gangrene. The jurymen masters’ 
position was fraught enough that they sought legitimating approval for it from the Ulm town 
physician, which they received.73 Margarete’s position, represented by her husband’s testimony, 
was also supported: by the provost.  He suspected that one or more barbers, not the patient, were 
to blame, at very least because they accused each other.  Thus what differentiated in the end was 
not some obvious – or blurred – divide between lay and expert or professional knowledge and 
practice.  What differentiated knowledge of what happened to Margarete’s arm, and why, into 
two accounts was referral of the case to an outside adjudicator.  And yet the judgment of the 
outside experts dedifferentiated: the sworn masters explained the effects of bandage removal by 
reference not to their special surgical knowledge, but to widely shared humoral theory.  
Differentiation and dedifferentiation were no less subtle yet significant in juridical cases, 
which, according to standard stories of the rise of expert medical testimony in the 16th century 
and earlier, ought to have been considerably more straightforwardly differentiated and expert-
led. We can see this by returning to the case of Clauß Guntram in 1517, whose well-informed 
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defense against charges of having killed another man was presented in Section 1 above.  
Guntram named a barber-surgeon as witness, Master Hans Albrecht.  Albrecht testified that he 
“examined” the wound inflicted by Guntram the day after.  By measuring with his instrument, he 
“found” that the stab ended at the rib.74  This was a standard procedure, detailed in contemporary 
books of surgery, for therapeutic and forensic prognosis.  A wound ending already at the rib was 
considered a minor injury.75  In addition to basing his testimony on this manual procedure and 
know-how, the master alluded to his special knowledge with the remark that he applied a 
bandage as appropriate for such wounds (wie sich Zu solichenn wunden geburt).  Moreover, he 
presented himself as a master of his art by stating that he “healed” the man in less than three 
weeks.  Finally, Albrecht presented prognosis as part of his special knowing by recounting how 
he cautioned the convalescent victim, Genßhenn, against hard work for a quarter of a year to 
allow full recovery.76 These are the ways in which differentiation of knowing occurred in this 
case. 
The dedifferentiation of knowing in Guntram’s trial occurred twofold. First, the barber-
surgeon testified in response to questions that were put to all nine witnesses, exactly as we saw 
in the Rode case.  If medical qualification and experience singled him out from the others, the 
procedure and context of testimony grouped him right back with them. Second, the barber-
surgeon’s statements were no more exact in description or relevant in explanation than those of 
the other witnesses. Two neighbours recounted visiting the victim Genßhenn while he was 
bedridden for the second time, that is, after his alleged recovery. They inquired into the nature of 
his sickness and reported patient narrative just as a doctor might have done: Genßhenn described 
the feeling of a “lump on his heart.” They also presented evidence against the lethality of the 
stabbing: the victim had let them “see” that his scar was closed and himself did not attribute his 
second period of illness to the stabbing.77 Even Pastor Conradt vonn Steinhem, who visited 
bedridden Genßhenn to hear confession and administer the sacraments, testified that “outside of 
confession” he had asked “how the wound was doing” and received Genßhenn’s answer: “it is 
healed.”78 And the barber-surgeon? He attested recovery by recounting from everyday life: that 
some weeks after the stabbing he and Genßhenn had gone to market together to buy pigs, walked 
back, and shared a meal.  The evidence he gave to account for Genßhenn’s fatal illness following 
recovery was as much everyday as medical: the convalescent had failed to follow surgeon’s 
orders and had over-taxed his body too soon through hard work, for which Albrecht was able to 
cite the late patient’s account: Genßhenn had reported that he had felt a “cracking” in his body 
when lifting timber.79  If it was obvious that one called the barber-surgeon and not the pastor or 
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the neighbor to treat a stab wound, they were virtually all of a piece in giving – creating – 
evidence.  
It might be objected that we have been able to illustrate these processes of differentiation 
and dedifferentiation happening within a single case because we have chosen one from early in 
the 16th century, before the rise of expert witnessing as formalized in new criminal law.  Yet the 
same dynamics of differentiation and commonality of knowing can be found in trials such as the 
Rode case of 1551 – after a half century of legal reform that included the Carolina, supposed 
watershed in the rise of expert medical witnessing, and with testimony by two official town 
doctors and six sworn barber-surgeons.80    
These dynamics began at the sickbed, in observational practice before Anna died.  
Anna’s foster-mother, Anna Buchens, came when she heard about the beating and was asked to 
attend at the bedside. Herself a midwife, she cared for Anna to the end.  Despite her expertise, 
however, she called for the official town doctor, Johann Stock, to examine the sick, using the 
official term besichtigen.  This was to differentiate official observation not only from everyday 
observation of the body, but from experienced – expert – observation of the body, a 
differentiation we explore below in the conclusion.  This differentiating momentum in the case 
began at about the same time as its opposite: when Rode’s mother and Anna’s sister also came to 
examine her: “Annen zubesichtigen.”81  They and other “lay” female witnesses would later be 
able to provide more detailed explanations and observations than Dr. Stock. Anna drank too 
much – beer, wine and huge quantities of mineral water; she had had constant health complaints 
since a stillbirth; they had observed no signs of serious injury or severe illness after the violent 
encounter with her husband, nor vomiting or bleeding. Moreover, they would report signs of 
other sickness, such as fever, confirm that she had fallen down the cellar stairs, and testify that 
Anna had been able to work and talk sensibly after the beating.82  These, then, were the momenta 
of differentiation and dedifferentiation of knowers – official medical expert and “lay” female 
witness – before Anna died. 
The dynamic continued after her death. Six barber-surgeons participated in examining the 
body and dissecting its visible wounds.  They found a bruise over the left eye and black and blue 
areas on the back.  Dissection and probing of these revealed coagulated blood and no bone 
breakage behind the bruise.  Following examination, the six barber-surgeons deliberated and 
reported their conclusions collectively at the town hall. They concluded that they could not 
decide whether Anna died from beating, falling down, or another sickness.83  No one else was 
invited into this procedure – though, as we know, others attended.   
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Yet as soon as the case file began to take shape, this differentiation of expert official 
observation from other observation began to dissolve.  The barber-surgeons’ postmortem report 
to the council was not copied into the file. It sat in an official book in the town hall: never even 
quoted (though referred to) in the more than 150 manuscript pages of the Rode proceedings 
preserved today. Thus there was nothing written to prevent the institution of oral testimony from 
having the same levelling effect we saw in the Guntram trial 35 years before.  In this way, the 
central practice of inquisition – questioning – had the opposite effect from the one usually 
attributed to it with regard to the rise of expertise.  Inquisition broke up the collective unanimous 
expert opinion of the sworn master surgeons in their official deposition to the city council. 
Surgeons and physicians were individually questioned and their responses recorded as 
individuals alongside and undistinguished from all other individual witnesses, notably the 
housewives.  And the answers given by all were usually comparable with one another in terms of 
descriptive and explanatory content.84   
The hearings did more.   
“Did you assist in anatomizing Anna after her death?” Highest Justice Mohr wanted to 
know – again, asking the housewives as well as each of the six sworn surgeons and official town 
physicians.  Clearly, he assumed that the housewives could perfectly well have assisted in the 
official autopsy, but that is not specifically the point here. “No, I did not help,” Anna Housewife 
of Johann von Buchens answered, “but once the barber-surgeons had cut her open I saw that 
there had been black and blue coagulated blood (geliebertt blut) in the bruises and spots 
(mälern), but whence this bleeding came is unknown to me.”85  To be sure, the mayor did not 
ask the housewives to join the surgeons in carrying out the postmortem inspection.  But Anna 
Buchens observed the body as carefully as the barber-surgeons did and testified with 
approximately the same level of descriptive detail.  Yet this, too, is not specifically the point 
here.  The point is rather one of mechanisms of dedifferentiation: the witness hearings 
retroactively transformed specialist official inspection, the “Besichtigung” ordered by the mayor, 
into knowing in common.  This is especially remarkable because that event had been officially 
closed, signed and sealed in one of the city’s books. 
 
Conclusion 
Commonality in diversity is the main finding of this study.  To see this, rather than difference 
and dialogue, required setting aside categories like expert and lay to examine the practices of all 
concerned.  Historians have come to examine a range of witnesses and other participants in early 
modern criminal and witch trials, but this may be the first study, regarding any historical time 
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and place, of the knowledge roles of the full range of participants in a much wider variety of 
public cases.86  Hidden in the diversity of situations in these cases, whose protagonists usually 
belong to separate histories, is a set of common practices: observing, inspecting, and reporting; 
weighing of diverse evidence and certifying or judging on that basis; reasoning to causal 
accounts of complex events in the physical and human world.  The cases were diverse in at least 
four ways: (1) participation, (2) situation and applicable rules, (3) evaluating institutions, (4) 
polity, which ranged from village to city to empire, from self-government of sovereign city-
states to local government in the Habsburg Empire (with consultation of an institution in a 
neighboring territorial-administrative state) to government of a small principality by the provost 
of an abbey (with consultation of an institution in a confessionally opposite state).  These four 
kinds of diversity show the depth and extent of the commonality of knowing practices.  
Expertise does not need “rethinking.”87 It needs a rest. Thinking in terms of expertise 
blinds us to common knowledge. Modern can learn from premodern here. Historical studies of 
law and science, or law and medicine, usually adopt the language of expertise and the category 
of expert witness. This disinvites investigation of all participants as knowers. The focus remains 
on men of science and physicians as experts.88  Historians of premodern medicine have 
diversified this picture by studying a variety of experts in trials – legal as well as medical, 
midwives as well as surgeons and physicians. Yet it remains a picture of difference and 
interaction.89 Would setting aside categories like expert and lay and studying all participants as 
knowers, as we have done, yield similar results for more recent times, showing shared empirical 
rationality?  At very least, the invention of the concept of lay expertise and controversy over 
these categories in social studies of recent science, technology, and medicine suggest it might.90 
Many of the situations of uncertainty, disagreement, or accusation studied in this paper have 
modern counterparts.91 This is not to preach continuity over change.  The history between then 
and now may conform neither to lines of continuity nor to lines of change, like the “rise” of 
special knowledges and occupations, but comprise multiple trajectories of emergence and 
disappearance and re-emergence of knowing in common. Only then will a general history of 
expertise become possible, a history that does not presume what it ought to explain and that 
neither expands into the history of every activity in which human beings build up special 
experience nor contracts into the history of competing claims to such experience.  
The problem is not that historical studies have been insufficiently constructionist or 
indeed historical about expertise. Showing how expertise was contested and constructed leaves 
intact the focus on special knowledge and claims to it, hence on different groups and their status 
and rivalry. The very idea of expertise is the problem. It is limiting because it necessarily means 
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special (everyone cannot be the expert92), a limitation not lifted by the discovery that there have 
also been “lay” experts, having their own knowledge and gaining authority or opportunity to 
pronounce on public matters in certain times and places. Specialty there was, of course, and 
interaction but also – and that has been the thesis of the foregoing paper – shared practices of 
knowing. The point is not a wider picture of who knew, but a different picture of what knowing 
was and, ultimately, how and why it occurred. This paper is not a call for inclusiveness as such.  
An account of knowledge society – 16th century or 20th – which included everyone according to 
what made each group special would still miss the point. 
This opens a new problem: If knowledge was so common, then why was the testimony of 
physicians and surgeons needed at all? One way of tackling this concluding question would be to 
ask what determined why cases were decided in one way or the other. That might show the 
relative efficacy of diverse participants’ descriptions and explanations. Yet for any given case, 
this question can seldom be answered, as the historian never fully knows what went on orally 
behind and around the documents nor what documents may be missing.  Taken in the aggregate, 
however, large numbers of cases tend to show that (1) the social status of the accused was less 
important in trial outcomes than we might expect, and (2) social connectedness was crucial, that 
is, how many people you could mobilize on your behalf (as in the case of Martin Rode), or not 
(as in the case of Martin Naff). Recent research shows that even trials for crimes punishable by 
death were usually integrative and oriented toward consensus. For these could destabilize the 
polity.93 The perpetuation of polities based largely on negotiated consensus depended on 
involving as many people as possible in that consensus. The language of this perpetuation was 
that of peace, as in Stadtfrieden or Landfrieden.94  No one could be left out of the peace, or at 
least that was the ideal approximated as much as possible in practice. Such a system seems to 
have little or no place for specially experienced knowers.   
In fact it did, but not as specialists. To leave no one out of the peace meant to include (1) 
all who were implicated through social ties, whether of kinship, neighborhood, or household, and 
(2) all who were responsible through public office for the area of social and material life in 
which the disagreement, uncertainty, or possible injustice occurred. This is where the doctors 
and surgeons come in.  Responsibility more than specialty: that, oddly enough by our standards 
and histories of expertise, is how to understand their involvement. Doctors and barber-surgeons 
in public office testified, inspected, reported, certified, or recommended decisions not as unique 
or superior knowers but as those on duty in matters of health and disease, injury and death, 
purity and danger. Their oaths of office made them responsible for bodily aspects of community 
welfare.95  That did not exclude the possibility that others had comparable knowledge and 
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experience and that they, too, would contribute, as can be seen in all of the proceedings 
examined in this paper.  These cases suggest that all relevant knower groups had to be 
represented in the process so that consensus and peace could result. Thus physicians and 
surgeons, who appear to our eyes as expert witnesses and evaluators, in fact belonged to a highly 
knowledgeable consensus-building society rather than an expert-governed lay one.  
Amidst the commonality of knowing, there was one difference between those involved 
through social ties and those involved through office. This was the difference between being 
party and not being party to the events and persons in question. Office-holding physicians and 
surgeons typically swore an oath of impartiality.96 They were supposed to testify or certify or 
evaluate knowledgeably without being party – literally without having had a part in events, from 
outside the situation of disagreement, uncertainty, or possible wrong-doing and the web of social 
relations to which it belonged.97 To act justly, office holders had to be independent, uninvolved.  
Yet this made them at the same time dependent, on those who were involved. Knowledgeable 
parties were as vital to proceedings as impartial knowers – not despite but because they were 
party.  They knew events, contexts, bodies far more intimately than the office-holding doctors 
and surgeons could do, or could do alone.  And we know from all of the cases considered here 
that this local knowledge meant not only reporting what one saw, but also explaining and 
judging.  Impartial expertise did not trump local expertise, or personally referred testimony.  
Otherwise in the Naff case, for instance, inspection and certification by the far-off Strasbourg 
medical collegium would have secured the old soldier’s status against villagers’ continuing 
observations and suspicions.  Exactly how implicated knowing and impartial knowing played out 
in testimony, evaluation, and the resolution or reopening of cases (and how this changed in the 
period under study) remains a question for further research. But it is beside the point here.  
Whatever such research might show, it is a fitting conclusion to this study of shared empirical 
rational practice that the knowledge of the two main kinds of participant in public cases – 
impartial and party – was not only common but complementary, indeed mutually dependent, in 
the one way in which they, necessarily, differed. 
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Alexander Kästner and Sylvia Kesper-Biermann, eds., Experten und Expertenwissen in der 
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Clark, 67-93. 
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Brill, 2013). 
20 But see recently Laura Kounine, “The Gendering of Witchcraft: Defence Strategies of Men 
and Women in German Witchcraft Trials,” German History 31 (3) 2013: 295-317.  
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Achim Landwehr, “ ‘...das ein nachbar uff den andern heimblich achtung gebe.’ ‘Denunciatio’, 
Rüge und ‘gute Policey’ im frühneuzeitlichen Württemberg” in Denunziation und Justiz: 
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30 For defence strategies of accused men and women, see Gerd Schwerhoff, Köln im 
Kreuzverhör: Kriminalität, Herrschaft und Gesellschaft in einer frühneuzeitlichen Stadt (Bonn: 
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31 IfS Crim. 6, 1v-3, 7, 8v, 10-11v, 13v. 
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Strafrechts (Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1879); more recently Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, “Zum 
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Seuche und Mensch: Herausforderung in den Jahrhunderten, ed. Carl C. Wahrmann, Martin 
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2009); Stein, “Meaning of Signs”; Luke Demaitre, Leprosy in Premodern Medicine: A Malady 
of the Whole Body (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), chs. 1-2.   
34 Example of demand by a tanner’s wife: certificate by Nördlingen Stadtarzt Johann Widmann 
for Margaretha Breydnerin; Stadtarchiv Nördlingen (hereafter StadtANö) R39, F2, 12, 
1547.08.11. 
35 For some striking examples, see Demaitre, Leprosy, chs. 1-2. 
36 Robert Jütte, “Lepra-Simulanten: ‘De iis qui morbum simulant’” in Neue Wege in der 
Seuchengeschichte, ed. Martin Dinges and Thomas Schlich (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1995), 25-42, on 
pp. 33-38. 
37 Annemarie Kinzelbach, “‘Böse Blattern’ oder ‘Franzosenkrankheit’: Syphilis-konzept, Kranke 
und die Genese des Krankenhauses in oberdeutschen Reichsstädten der frühen Neuzeit” in Neue 
Wege, ed. Dinges and Schlich, 43-69; Stein, Negotiating, 147-170; Hammond, “Medical 
Examination.” 
38 StadtANö R39, F2, 12, 1544.09.03. 
39 StadtANö R39, F2, 29, 1594.11.20; for this and other contested cases in Nördlingen, see 
Hammond, “Medical Examination”; on perception of such behavior as women’s stubbornness, 
see Claudia Ulbrich, “Unartige Weiber: Präsenz und Renitenz von Frauen im frühneuzeitlichen 
Deutschland” in Richard van Dülmen, ed., Arbeit, Frömmigkeit und Eigensinn (Frankfurt a. M.: 
Fischer, 1990), 13–42. 
40 Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Medizinischen Fakultät (hereafter UAT): UAT 20/10, 
1656.01.25: letter from bailiff at Horb to the faculty, protocol of inspection, corrected draft of 
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41 Horb was the administrative center of a Landvogtei in Swabia and belonged to the Habsburg 
Empire: Christoph Fichtner, “Das mittelalterliche Horb und sein Stadtrecht” in Die Habsburger 
im deutschen Südwesten, ed. Franz Quarthal (Stuttgart: Thorbecke 2000), 89-98. 
42 Robert Jütte, Ärzte, Heiler und Patienten (München: Artemis & Winkler, 1991); Gianna 
Pomata, Contracting a cure: patients, healers, and the law in early modern Bologna (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Gentilcore, Healers and Healing, 177-210. 
43 For a recipe of an ointment contra lepram see Julius Zacher, “Zwei medicinische recepte,” 
Zeitschrift für deutsches Alterthum (1867), 381-83. 
44 Pomata, Contracting a Cure. 
45 UAT 20/10, 1656.01.25: corrected draft of response letter. 
Mendelsohn Kinzelbach Common Knowledge 2 26 
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47 UAT 20/10, 1656.01.25, sealed letter of the bailiff in Horb, presented by Martin Naff. 
48 See note <33> above; see also Jon Arrizabalaga, John Henderson, and Roger French, The 
Great Pox: The French Disease in Renaissance Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997), 252-77. 
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Modern Europe?” Folklore 115 (2004): 151-166.  For the spreading of knowledge about cures 
for the French disease by broadsheets in England, see Wear, “Popular Medicine and the New 
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Flugblatt als Wissensmedium der frühen Neuzeit (Opladen: Budrich, 2011); see generally Ulrich 
Rousseaux, “Flugschriften und Flugblätter im Mediensystem des Alten Reiches” in Johannes 
Arndt (ed.), Das Mediensystem im Alten Reich der Frühen Neuzeit, 1600-1750 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2010), 99-114. 
51 Demaitre, Leprosy, 275-76; Arrizabalaga, Henderson and French, Great Pox, 271. 
52 See, for example, Gowing, Common Bodies; Susanna Burghartz, “Ordering Discourse and 
Society: Moral Politics, Marriage and Fornication during the Reformation and the 
Confessionalisation Process in Germany and Switzerland” in Social Control in Europe, 1500-
1800, ed. Herman Roodenburg (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2004), 78–98; Gudrun 
Piller, Private Körper: Spuren des Leibes in Selbstzeugnissen des 18. Jahrhunderts (Köln: 
Böhlau, 2007), part 2 on the body and marriage relations; Edward Behrend-Martinez, Unfit for 
Marriage: Impotent Spouses on Trial in the Basque Region of Spain, 1650-1750 (Reno: 
University of Nevada Press, 2007); and for finance-related trials focused on the female body in 
pregnancy, childbirth, and death, see de Renzi, “Risks of Childbirth.”   
53 Ulm Museum (hereafter UM), AV 950 II; on the Ulm barber-surgeons, Kinzelbach, “Erudite 
and Honoured Artisans?” 
54 UM, AV 950 II, 38-39, 1605.07.23. 
55 Recently on family economy and guilds: Danielle van den Heuvel, “Partners in marriage and 
business? Guilds and the family economy in urban food markets in the Dutch Republic’, 
Continuity and Change, 23/02 (2008): 217-36. 
56 UM, AV 950 II, 38, 1605.07.23.  
57 Sabine von Heusinger, Die Zunft im Mittelalter: Zur Verflechtung von Politik, Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft in Straßburg (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2009), p. 116; Patrick Schmidt, Wandelbare 
Traditionen – tradierter Wandel: Zünftische Erinnerungskulturen in der frühen Neuzeit (Köln: 
Böhlau, 2009), p. 152. 
58 Recent studies of “medical expertise” point out epistemological weakness yet social strength 
of physician testimony but do not question the category; see Silvia De Renzi, “Medical 
Expertise, Bodies, and the Law in Early Modern Courts,” Isis 98 (2007), 315-22. 
59 IfS Crim. 25, 30. 
60 On classic consilia concerning time lapse between wound and death, see Trevor Dean, Crime 
and Justice in Late Medieval Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 5, esp. 
101-02; early-16th-century German legal texts provided guidance on this and related kinds of 
case: Brunnenmeister, Die Quellen der Bambergensis, 1879, 139-41; see De Renzi, “Witnesses,” 
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consilium by Zacchias arguing that death was from disease (plague) rather than a head wound. 
61 IfS Crim. 25, f. 24v (ob die Hirnschall vnnd Dura vnnd pia Mater durch das schlagen 
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62 Blumenthal, “Domestic Medicine,” 519. 
63 See Gowing, Common Bodies, 16 (“the female body was a public affair”), 43-45 (“juries of 
matrons”), 53, passim. 
64 IfS Crim. 25, f. 25. 
65 IfS Crim. 25, f. 45. 
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eins.” 
67 Esther Fischer-Homberger, Medizin vor Gericht: Gerichtsmedizin von der Renaissance bis zur 
Aufklärung (Bern: Huber, 1983); Catherine Crawford, “Legalizing medicine: early modern legal 
systems and the growth of medico-legal knowledge” in Legal Medicine in History, ed. Clark and 
Crawford, 89-116; Watson, Forensic Medicine. 
68 See note <89> below. 
69 See for example Spary, Eating the Enlightenment, 8. 
70 UM, AV 950 I, 80-90, quotation on 85: Zu Erkennen, waaß Recht Ist. 
71 UM, AV 950 I, 81-89. With few exceptions, the record of the interrogation by the sworn 
masters concurs with the previous account in the provost’s letter but is more precise in providing 
names. 
72 UM, AV 950 I, 80-81, 84. 
73 UM, AV 950 I, 90. 
74 IfS Crim. 6, f. 5. 
75 Hans von Gerdorff, Feldbuch der Wundartzney (Straßburg: Johannes Schott, 1517), fol. 35; 
Brunschwig, Wund Artzney, 1513, 2, 21-25.  
76 IfS Crim. 6, 7-7v. 
77 IfS Crim. 6, 8-10. 
78 IfS Crim. 6, 14v-15. 
79 IfS Crim. 6, f. 7-7v. 
80 On the Carolina as “landmark in the history of forensic medicine”: Crawford, “Medicine and 
the Law,” 1623; Watson, Forensic Medicine, 18, 20-22. 
81 IfS Crim. 25, f. 42. 
82 IfS Crim. 25, ff. 61v-62, 64v, 65, 67v, 68, 69v, 72, 73v-74v. 
83 IfS Crim. 25, 27-43. 
84 IfS Crim. 25, 44-45. 
85 IfS Crim. 25, 46v-48 (erstes Befragungsprotokoll), 74-75 (zweites Befragungsprotokoll). 
86 See most recently Rublack, The Astronomer and the Witch, esp. 80-83, 157-76, including 
interpretation of bodily signs by family members, both “lay” and medically trained (barber-
surgeon, royal physician).  Our net could be cast even more widely to include civil law cases and 
cases that involved medical testimony but that we do not include here, such as infanticide, 
poisoning, impotence, and insanity.  Most studies consider one or two kinds of case and one or 
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such as Lorenz, Kriminelle Körper, tend to address questions of power, cultural meaning, social 
norms, and their construction; but for knowledgeable agency of the accused, see now Kounine, 
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lay knowledge.  
90 Arguing against thinking in expert/lay dichotomies: Brian Wynne, “May the Sheep Safely 
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91 See, for example, Sheila Jasanoff, “The Eye of Everyman: Witnessing DNA in the Simpson 
Trial,” Social Studies of Science, 1998, 28:713-740. 
92 A revealing limit case of this is food, on which “everybody is an expert”: Spary, Eating the 
Enlightenment, p. 290. 
93 For criminal justice, the research on these points has been systematic; see Eibach, “Städtische 
Strafjustiz.”  The pattern seems to hold for the other kinds of proceeding examined in this paper, 
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94 Eibach, “Städtische Strafjustiz,” 189-90. 
95 See generally Andrew W. Russell, ed., The Town and State Physician in Europe from the 
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Germany, see most recently Ruth Schilling, Sabine Schlegelmilch, and Susan Splinter, “Stadtarzt 
oder Arzt in der Stadt? Drei Ärzte der Frühen Neuzeit und ihr Verständnis des städtischen 
Amtes,” Medizinhistorisches Journal, 46 (2011): 99-133.   
96 A well-documented example for the 16th and 17th centuries is Zurich: Gustav Adolf Wehrli, 
Die Krankenanstalten und die öffentlich angestellten Ärzte und Wundärzte im alten Zürich 
(Zürich: Leemann, 1934), 39-40, 83, 86; see also Schilling, Schlegelmilch, and Splinter, 
“Stadtarzt,” 101, 118-19. 
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difficult to avoid personal or prior healing relations.  In the Rode case, for example, one of the 
barber-surgeons (Jacob Stolhofen) declared a friendship with Rode. 
